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ABSTRACT
The study shows, based on archive sources, Hungarian, Serbian and Croatian literature,
how the relations between Hungary and Yugoslavia changed from the autumn 
of 1944 to the end of 1947. It proceeds from the fact that the descent into war not only
made Hungary’s revisionist efforts fail, but also put severe strain on the relationship
between the two nations. Between 1945 and 1947 Hungary had become a country
under military occupation, lost its sovereignty and fell under the authority of the
Allied Control Commission (ACC), thus the relationships were not rebuilt between two
equal nations. The study presents and analyzes in detail the actions of the Yugoslavian
delegation which was ordered to work beside the ACC, the problems that arose
between the two governments, among other things, the question of transplanting
the German ethnicities in Bácska to Hungarian regions.
The author discusses in detail the anti-Hungarian sanctions carried out by the
Yugoslavian Army and the local Slavic population in the Southern Region, examines
the confiscation of Hungarian citizens’ property in Yugoslavia, addresses the question
of land claims in the Baja triangle as well as the population exchange agreement
that was established at the 1946 Paris Peace Conference but was never realized.
The last part of the study discusses the establishment of diplomatic relations between
Hungary and Yugoslavia, and the Treaty of Friendship signed by the two countries
upon Tito’s 1947 visit to Budapest. The good relationship came to an end in the spring
of 1948, due to international political reasons and suddenly reached an all-time low.
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Gustav Kálnoky, while serving as the joint Secretary of State of the Austro–Hungarian
Empire, made a remark regarding the nature of foreign policy that is still valid today.
He wrote: “the freedom in making foreign policy decisions depends on the strength
of internal authority”. 1
By the end of 1944 Hungary and Yugoslavia were not on equal terms neither
in the freedom to make decisions on foreign policy nor in the strength of their
internal authority. The post war collapse meant not only that the success of former
revisionist attempts would be dissolved, but the revision and the war seriously
taxed the relationship with neighboring countries like Yugoslavia, among others.
As we know, the diplomatic relations between Hungary and the Kingdom 
of Yugoslavia were terminated following Yugoslavia’s military collapse and
division in 1941. During the war Hungary maintained its diplomatic relations
with the Independent Croatian State through ambassadors. In Serbia, occupied
by Germany, there was only a consulate and Serbia had no representative 
in Budapest. Post-war relations of Yugoslavia and Hungary were rebuilt under
radically different internal and international circumstances. The world had changed
a great deal by the end of 1944, the power relations had shifted unequivocally 
in favor of the now internationally recognized Yugoslavia. The defeated Hungary
was seated in the defendant’s chair by the great powers. As a consequence of the
peace treaty, three million Hungarians found themselves outside their country’s
borders again, while Yugoslavia triumphantly took its place on the victors’ side,
and reunited the country that had been divided up in 1941. This internationally
recognized state reconstruction effectively legitimized the internal power of the
new communist elite, the unequivocally Soviet-style (communist) societal
configuration.
From 1945 to 1947 Hungary was a country under military occupation regaining
its formal sovereignty only after the 1947 Paris Peace Treaty. Before that, just like
many of the war’s losing countries, such as Italy, Finland, Romania and Bulgaria,
it remained under international control by means of the ACC (Allied Control
Commission). The ACC was specified to operate in Hungary in the Armistice
Agreement of January 20th, 1945 in Moscow between Hungary and the Soviet Union.
The Soviets, the British and the Americans along with Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia
were authorized to send missions to Hungary as members of a reparations subcommittee
working alongside the ACC. The ACC oversaw the whole of Hungary’s internal
affairs and foreign policy, economy, railway system and airspace. Hungary’s Federal
Control Commission’s work was terminated on September 15th, 1947, on this
day Moscow placed the Hungarian peace treaty in trust, and this meant the Armistice
Agreement had expired. It was from this hierarchal, victor–loser situation that
Hungarian–Yugoslavian relations were rebuilt after WWII.
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The first members of the Yugoslavian delegation arrived in Debrecen on
March 10th, 1945 amidst a raging storm; the number of people taking part in the
mission soon grew to 10. We can assume that the number continued to grow with
time but sources cannot determine the rate of this growth. For the sake of comparison:
the Soviet delegation numbered about 800 people, the British about 300 whilst
the USA was represented by approximately 120-130 people and the initial 20 member
Czechoslovakian delegation grew to 90. Both the occupying Soviet forces and the
ACC delegations were supported at the expense of the Hungarian state. The leader
of the Yugoslavian delegation was Colonel Obrad Cicmil2, among the members was
Captain Lazar Brankov, who was later to play an important role in the Rajk trial3.
Lieutenant-colonel Jovan Lonèar was Cicmil’s deputy. Other members included
Major Mihaljo Javorski, Captains Pal Kovaè and Grujo Spahiè and Lieutenants
Djordje Milaniæ and Rajko Popoviæ. The economic experts were Vladimir Gavriloviæ
and Mirko Vukotiæ. The Yugoslavian mission’s tasks included searching for stolen
Yugoslavian assets, the question of restoration between the two countries as well
as searching for and extraditing war criminals. Due to the lack of official diplomatic
relations, the Yugoslavian ACC mission, in addition to their original function
ensured the connection between Budapest and Belgrade. Aside from maintaining
the relationship between the two communist parties, the Yugoslavian mission played
an important role in reinitiating political, cultural relationships between the two
countries as well as in the exchange of information due to the lack of other
channels of communication. The fact that Hungary had no official representation
in Belgrade until 1947 made the relationship fairly one-sided.
Apart from fully supporting the occupying Soviet troops, the Hungarian state
was entirely responsible for the whole ACC administration as well as the Czechoslovakian
and Yugoslavian missions (living quarters, offices, fuel, food and entertainment
allowances, casinos, cars, car repair workshops and sports facilities were all maintained
by the state). This was a serious problem for Hungary, which had suffered severe
damages during the war and was paying these expenses in addition to reparations.4
Neither of the ACC missions exercised moderation. Records show that during one
month, the Czechoslovakian delegation ordered 13 thousand (!) bottles of alcoholic
beverages and the Yugoslavians ordered 20 Persian rugs in addition to their Baroque
style office furniture.5 The arrival of the mission to Budapest already posed several
problems because the building of the Yugoslavian consulate was damaged during
the siege of Budapest.
Apart from reparations, other issues concerning both countries were discussed
on May 7th, 1945, just a few weeks after the first meeting. Cicmil, accompanied 
by Brankov, who spoke excellent Hungarian, called upon Gyöngyösi and they
held a discussion lasting over an hour on how to improve the relations between
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the two countries as well as the problems they were facing at the time. Gyöngyösi
brought up the disorganized and inhumane mass relocation of Hungarians in the
Southern Region, to which Cicmil replied, in an effort to “counterbalance” the issue
that he disapproved of Hungary’s expulsion of five Serbian families living by the border.
Cicmil also alluded to the, in his opinion, “unjustified” searches conducted in the
homes of Serbians along the border as well as the armed conflict that had erupted
between Hungarian and Yugoslavian border guards. He also mentioned the
question of Yugoslavian territories having been “robbed of certain assets”. During
the meeting, which, according to the report, was conducted in a “friendly mood”,
Gyöngyösi tried to answer all of Cicmil’s questions with accurate information.
Thus, he referenced the fact that Yugoslavian partisans had smuggled weapons across
the border and hid them in villages populated by Yugoslavians as a justification
for the home searches conducted in the border regions. He also said that the return
of Serbian assets was encumbered by the fact that instead of the Yugoslavian
mission an unauthorized delegation had attempted to act in the matter recently
in Szeged.6
On December 31st, 1945 György Heltai, Department Councillor of the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs, handed over the Hungarian government’s memorandum 
in which Hungary “acknowledges” the formation of the Socialist Federal Republic
of Yugoslavia, the deposition of King Peter II, and the establishment of the
Constituent Assembly of Yugoslavia. The meeting lasted almost two hours, during
which Heltai inquired primarily about the reason why “in recent weeks Yugoslavian
factors did not deal with us in the friendly spirit in which they had before”. Cicmil
did not deny that they felt that their “friendly gestures had remained unrequited”,
and then went on to discuss in detail the reasons for their dissatisfaction. Firstly,
he mentioned the education issue, stating that there was “not a single Yugoslavian
school established in Hungary”. Even though, he continued, he had received 
a promise from the Prime Minister that there will be an inquiry into the matter
by a joint committee, this never happened.7 They had turned to the Hungarian
government several times about the extradition of war criminals, but they only
received a reply to their memorandum in the press. He went on to say, certain
newspapers had reported that officials in Budapest had already scheduled the ringleaders
of the Novi Sad raids to stand trial, instead of extraditing them to Yugoslavia 
in accordance with the armistice because they had committed their “shameful
business” here.8 Cicmil also reproached Heltai saying they feel that “Hungarian
revisionist propaganda has been resurrected” in the Hungarian press, so they “should
not be surprised if because of this the Yugoslavian press, out of exasperation,
publishes a few acerbic articles”. However, this does not influence the Yugoslavian
government in “ensuring Hungarians can exercise the fullest range of rights”, he added
104
Academic Announcements
Délvidéki Szemle Vol III. No 2. 2016.
as if to ease tension. Afterward Heltai tried to convince Cicmil that the addressed
problems were not due to a change in the Hungarian government’s behavior
towards Yugoslavia, but can be traced back to a lack of accurate information and
the slow-moving function of state bodies. He requested that they accept what he says
“despite any opposing information”, because in contrast with certain press circles,
the Hungarian government believes revisionist propaganda to be “just as unwise
as the Yugoslavians do”. Cicmil, after hearing Heltai’s arguments, admitted that
the reason behind the problems between the two countries were the North Bácska
results of the Yugoslavian election, because “especially in the smallholders’ region,
50% of the Hungarian population voted against the government even though they
have no cause for complaint against the modern Yugoslavia”.9
József Rex, who was from the Vajdaság and spoke Serbian well, became the liaison
between the Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the ACC’s Yugoslavian
delegation. He had received his position in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs explicitly
due to Soviet pressure. Rex was a member of the Yugoslavian Communist Party,
a partisan and then a lieutenant in the Red Army. He later became the secretary
of the Hungarian consulate in Belgrade in 1947. He had played an important role
in the establishment of the Yugoslav–Hungarian Association, of which he was the
first secretary-general.10
The relationship between the two countries, as we know, was already strained
by recent events, primarily by the annexation of the Southern Region to Hungary
and the 1942 raids in South Bácska and Novi Sad. The effects of the raids on Hungarians
living in Yugoslavia were utterly tragic. The government received an increasing number
of reports about the retaliations inflicted on Hungarians in the Southern Region,
such as the execution of innocent civilians, expulsion, confiscation of assets and
labor camps.
Initial news of atrocities committed by partisans in the Southern Region arrived
at the Minorities Department of the government from the disintegrating but still
functional Hungarian civil service administration in the Southern Region before
the collapse caused by the war, during the Lakatos Administration. The first such
report came from the gendarmerie of Muraköz and Iván Nagy, Member of Parliament11
on August 31st, 1944, who forwarded a letter written on August 7th by Rózsi Lajkó
of Csáktornya to the ministry. The woman had written an account of the circumstances
surrounding their father’s death to her brother living in Doroszló. According to the
shocking letter on the night of July 23rd, partisans invaded the village, rounded up
68 people, forced them to the edge of the village to a swampy area where they shot
the elderly, among them Lajkó’s father.12
József Grõsz, the archbishop of Kalocsa and Bács, brought the expulsions 
and executions to the attention of János Gyöngyösi, Minister of Foreign Affairs,
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in a longer report at the end of April 1945 on behalf of the bishops of the Catholic
Church. He urged the government to take effective actions regarding the issue 
of expulsion. As we can read in his letter: “The Hungarians of the Southern Region
suffered serious tribulations at the end of last year when, as far as I could determine
from the credible information available with strict border closure, thousands and tens
of thousands of Hungarians have been kidnapped and taken to unknown locations
by Yugoslavian partisans. According to some almost unverifiable reports, the number
of Hungarians murdered by Yugoslavians can be estimated to be many thousands. [...]
In addition, in the past few days, Yugoslavian authorities have been expelling
Hungarians by the thousands from certain regions who moved to the Southern Region
after 1941 and are thus not Yugoslavian citizens, as well as those who fled their homes
when the Russian army entered but have since returned. I am aware that in accordance
with the armistice the Hungarian government is under obligation to transport all
non-Yugoslavian citizens from the Southern Region to Hungary but I object and 
I must urge the Minister of Foreign Affairs to take effective measures against these
proceedings, as these expulsions are indeed taking place. [...] They rounded up those
who were to be expelled, township by township, without warning, with only the most
necessary items of clothing that they were wearing and allowing only 500 P. to take
with them in cash on average. The homes of the expelled were sealed and marked
by the Yugoslavian authorities, but in many places they also began to carry away
equipment immediately.” 13
The arbitrary transplantation of the Yugoslavian Germans to Hungary also caused
serious problems in the two countries’ relationship. In June 1945 some 3000 Germans
were placed over the border in Kelebia, accompanied by 400 partisans. Their commander
threatened that if the Hungarians do not let them in, then “they will have them
line up along the border and shoot them”.14 On January 30th, 1946 the chief constable
of Nagykanizsa sent word to the Ministry of Internal Affairs that 16 days ago the
Yugoslavians had transported 4000 Germans in crowded train wagons under inhumane
conditions to Hungarian territories with the purpose of handing them over to the
Austrian authorities, who did not take them. These people were stranded at the
border station in Murakeresztúr, “there are only 1800 people left of the transplantees,
of whom many are ill with typhoid and dysentery. If they remain here we are facing
a nationwide epidemic.” 15
According to the official record drawn up on August 2nd, 1945, at the border station
outside Nagyszéksós, “a group of about 150 partisans held patrolmen at gunpoint and
placed light machine guns and machine guns on both sides of the bridge. The partisans
behind the Swabians chased the group of 157 people over to Hungarian territories.
When the Hungarian border guard commander requested them to be taken back
as per the ACC’s orders, the Serbian commander answered that he will prevent the
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transposal of the Germans even if it means fighting if necessary. He does not take
orders from the Russians, because they are nobodies, he only takes orders from Tito
and if he must he will beat the Russians back to the Tisza.” For emphasis, he added,
“if there is going to be a lot of talk, they will be at Röszke within half an hour and
within 2 hours at Szeged (at the cost of fighting if necessary) and the Danube–Tisza
line will be the new border”.16
More and more information was relayed to Hungary about the retaliations
against Yugoslavian Hungarians as well. On July 17th, 1947 Cardinal Mindszenty,
the Archbishop of Esztergom forwarded to Gyöngyösi János, Minister of Foreign
Affairs, the anonymous reports titled “Hungarian Fate in the Southern Regions”
and “Shedding a Light of Truth on Circumstances of Hungarians Living in Yugoslavia”
that were personally delivered to him by a delegation from the Southern Region.
They referred especially to the executions of Hungarians in Bezdán, the deportation
of the Hungarian population in Csurog and Zsablya and the tragic death of the
former lord-lieutenant of Szabadka, Andor Reök. “Dr. Andor Reök was deceived
into coming over and a few weeks later he was thrown from a balcony of the bán’s
castle in the Southern Region. Dr. József Bogner, newspaper editor, was executed after
being subjected to lengthy torture. The parson of Torontáloroszi was beaten to death
by Tito’s Gestapo in the basement. The 84 year old abbot of Horgos, István Virág,
died of fright on the sight of his execution. Lajos Varga, parson of Moholy, was dragged
for kilometers after a cart until he died of exhaustion. Afterward his corpse was mutilated.
István Köves, a chaplain from Mozsor, was kidnapped from Hungarian territory
and was taken down to Novi Sad.” They gave accounts of Hungarian people being
executed for sabotage in a mine in Vrdnik and they also mentioned an infamous
“slave market” operating in one of the internment camps in Novi Sad. “In the camp
at 5AM men and women must line up separately. At 5:30AM they step out in front
of their employers. They choose from among them and take them away. Some of the
employees who come only want women and girls. These employees are usually from
one army or another. There are an exceedingly large number of people infected with
syphilis. Toward the end of April at 3:30AM a soldier came to the camp into the women’s
sleeping quarters and chose a girl for himself saying he »only needed her for 2 hours«.
Accordingly, she trudged back half dead at 6AM. [...] They use ordained priests 
to clean toilets and to tan raw horse, cow and pig skin for months on end. They are
not permitted to celebrate mass or to anoint the sick (this would be considered
reactionary work). They are not even permitted to go out into the streets.” 17
The nationwide purges, as we know, were planned and orchestrated by the central
military–political circles. OZNA units Yugoslavia-wide received their orders to carry
out purges personally from Aleksandar Rankoviæ, Minister of Internal Affairs
and OZNA leader. The order was to liquidate the enemies of the people by means
107
Academic Announcements
Vol III. No 2. 2016. Délvidéki Szemle
of mass execution: political and class enemies, POWs and civilians, collaborants,
Ustashas, Chetniks, Hungarians, Germans, in other words anyone belonging to any
nationality or social class, apart from active partisans. The goal of the retaliations
against all peoples and nationalities in the last phase of the war was to annihilate
possible and assumed enemies, to force political opponents out of power, and to solidify
the power of the new, still weak state bodies through intimidation. Regarding this,
Serbian literature mentions the “Forest Psychosis” of the political elite, meaning
that anyone who was not a partisan (i.e. did not go into the forest) was considered
an enemy. In 1944, the famous–infamous OZNA Corps, whose 7 divisions and
many brigades operated all over Yugoslavia, was established for the explicit goal
of liquidating “the enemies of the people”. The actions of these Execution brigades
were supported by the local Slav population in ethnically mixed territories, such
as the Vajdaság, who in many cases took part in the attacks. The executions were
initially performed without any formal trial, based only on “say so”, in many places
according to lists left behind by Hungarian authorities containing the names of Arrow
Cross Party members, but anyone who was a member of the Hungarian Renewal
Party was automatically considered a war criminal, as well as those who held office
during the Hungarian Era – also levente-instructors, clergymen and teachers, in fact
anyone who simply enthusiastically welcomed the restoration of the Hungarian
Imperium in 1941.18
News of the atrocities, which went through from the Prime Minister’s Office
to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, were met with the response that “many reports contain
false information” by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and to speak of 40-45 thousand
executed and 30 thousand deported was “completely absurd”. “All things considered”,
writes József Rex, the Ministry’s rapporteur, regarding the matter, “the Hungarians’
situation is not very bright in Yugoslavia but it could be a lot worse”.19
My recent research has not changed my previous observations that the Hungarian
government did not protest against the executions to the ACC or the Yugoslavian
delegation. Sources have been uncovered that attest to the fact that American and
British delegates of the ACC, however, knew of the executions, and in many cases
requested information about these from the Hungarian government. During these
conversations, Ministry of Foreign Affairs officials primarily emphasized that they
had no “official reports” of the executions even though they had known about them.
However, data in connection to these cases, according to their opinion, had been
exaggerated to a great extent and was unverifiable. In June 1945, Vladimir Gavriloviæ,
the Yugoslavian delegation’s economic expert, contrary to real facts, had a conversation
with the Hungarian government in “quite a friendly tone” ensuring that “there is no
persecution against Hungarians in Bácska and never was. Mass expulsion of Hungarians
took place in merely two townships, Csurog and Zsablya and only in their own interest,
due to the known events in Novi Sad. Hungarians will be grouped into the regions
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abandoned by the Swabians, West Bácska, Hódság, etc. In Óbecse, for example,
trials were held by the People’s Court which indeed resulted in executions, but only
in cases where robbery, murder and complicity in the Novi Sad events were proven.”
Gavriloviæ also added: “The Hungarian are very lucky that Tito came to power,
otherwise the retroaction and revenge for the Novi Sad events would have been
truly terrible. Altogether the Hungarians are doing quite well...” 20 Our sources also
prove that the Hungarian government made complaints to the Yugoslavian government
via the ACC and the Yugoslavian delegation about the inhumane way the expulsions
were being carried out, which also effected the so-called “natives”, and also about
the illegal transplantation of the Germans of Vajdaság to Hungarian territory. 
On many occasions they requested that the officials expelled in accordance with
the armistice at least be given back their movable assets, allowing these to be brought
over. The Yugoslavian government cut the matter short with their reply on November
25th, 1945, stating that “the Hungarian officials who came to Yugoslavian territories
during the occupation as members of a fascist central administration did not bring
anything with them”, therefore there is nothing to be given back to them.21
On September 10th, 1946 the Ministry of Foreign Affairs addressed the ACC’s
Yugoslavian delegation in an oral memorandum regarding legal proceedings against
the branch- and establishment leaders of Hungarian companies with locations 
in Yugoslavia accused of collaboration, although, the memorandum did not mention
the accused by name. The government, led by Smallholder Party member Ferenc Nagy,
raised objection against the confiscation of assets on the grounds of “the armistice
being intended to settle the question of the property belonging to Hungarian natural
and legal persons on Yugoslavian territory along with the future of their rights and interests,
and said Yugoslavian regulation is obstructing these ordinances”. The Hungarian
government does not question, the memorandum continues, that the leaders 
of Hungarian owned companies must be held responsible for war crimes, but they
consider the regulation that “the assets of Hungarian legal persons will be confiscated
due to the possible guilt of the local company leaders” to be far-reaching and unlawful.
They also objected to the fact that the vast majority of company leaders were tried
without legal representation and declared people who “did everything in their power
to ensure that the occupation could use the plants in the companies’ possession 
in as small a degree as possible” war criminals.22
Yugoslavian propaganda regarding territory claims against Hungary began directly
after the reoccupation of Szabadka. On November 5th, 1944 at the Yugoslavian
Liberation ceremony in Szabadka, orators pledged allegiance to the Baja Triangle
and in a telegram addressed to Tito they stated “the commitment of the Bunjevci
of the Baja Triangle to the common homeland”. They also expressed their hope
that “in contrast with past guilty Yugoslavian governments, Tito and his people will
not neglect to annex the Baja Triangle”.23
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In Baranya and Vas Counties, in Mohács and Baja, along practically the whole
southern border, armed Yugoslavian troops questioned the Hungarian administration’s
authority. Around Letenye, for example, “Yugoslavians armed with weapons went
door to door to collect signatures” in the interest of annexing the territory to Yugoslavia.
The vice lord-lieutenant of Zala Castle District turned directly to the Minister 
of Defense for help, because, as he wrote in his letter on May 11th, 1945, a partisan
corps of 68 people had been “vandalizing” near the oil plants for several days,
“looting daily, they take horses from their carts...” and they “bound and kidnapped
Hungarian police officers”.24 In Baja, Csikéria, Tompa and Bácsalmás, Russian soldiers
detained “meddlesome” Yugoslavian gunmen and “categorically refused Yugoslavians
gaining any ground within Trianon country borders”, reads one of the Provisional
Government’s reports of January, 1945.25
On January 14th, 1945 a Yugoslavian delegation from the Pécs area, whose members
were of the ranks of the Antifašistièki front Slovena u Maðarskoj (Antifascist Front
of Slavs in Hungary), led by, according to Hungarian sources, the Yugoslavian
agent and Šokci ethnic writer from Gara, Antun Karagiæ, called on Josip Broz Tito
to request the annexation of the Baja Triangle to Yugoslavia. We also know that
the III. Yugoslavian army arriving in Pécs had received the specific order to take
over the city’s administration, which was, however, prevented by the Red Army.26
Land claims regarding the Baja Triangle were on the agenda in Yugoslavian
official circles until the Spring of 1946. In February of 1945 Josip Broz Tito, in a letter
addressed to Fyodor Ivanovich Tolbukhin, commander of the 3rd Ukrainian Front
and veteran of the Serbian and Hungarian battles, on the one part complained 
of the Hungarian government’s “oppressive politics” against the Yugoslavians,
and on the other, brought to Tolbukhin’s attention that he will, at the Yugoslavian
Peace Conference, based on “historical right”, demand the annexation of the Baja
Triangle and the Pécs and Arad areas to Yugoslavia. In his letter we can read: 
“As much as 50 000 of our countrymen27, mainly Serbs and Croats have remained
within Hungarian borders since World War I. Most of our compatriots reside 
in the Baja Triangle in the Pécs and Arad areas but there are many living along 
the whole of the Hungarian–Yugoslavian border, too. During the peace talks we
will demand the annexation of these regions to our country, because we are entitled
to them on the basis of historical right. Our residents, throughout history, have always
been persecuted by Hungarian feudal lords and German conquerors. They have
been violently displaced from these territories, violently Hungarianized. Persecution
of our residents has especially escalated during this war, which was accompanied
by the solidarity of the Slav peoples. Our brothers have still managed to maintain
their national identity though. Hungarian officials, even though the situation has
changed radically due to the arrival of the Soviet army, continue to pursue their
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prior policies against our residents. Searches, holding our brothers captive in camps
and arrests are everyday occurrences. I urge you to act quickly so that these residents
can be freed and please, prevent the Hungarian authorities from preceding in a similar
manner against our residents, and so that our compatriots can freely express their
national identity, be free to organize and to proclaim their antifascist views, and organize
their own military units and join the People’s Liberation Army of Yugoslavia.” 28
Yugoslavia used the border issue to put pressure on Hungary in order to aid
the communist party’s takeover. The main goal of Yugoslavian foreign policy at this
time was, as we know, to ensure the solidification of the new political authority,
and to which the means were as close a cooperation with the Soviet Union as possible
as well as establishing a Yugoslav-led Balkan-, possibly a Balkan-Eastern European
Federation.29 Along the northern border, they wanted to see a communist-led
Hungary that would cooperate closely with Yugoslavia.30
Apart from border modification, there were ideas in Yugoslavia on how to deal
with the “Hungarian issue”. Some saw the solution in the transfer of the entire
Hungarian population or a Yugoslavian–Hungarian population exchange, perhaps
combined with a smaller land concession for the benefit of Hungary. Vasa Èubriloviæ,
former assassin, later historian and politician, is credited for the first, whilst the
latter was devised by Sreten Vukosavljeviæ, Minister of Resettlement, sociologist
and expert on Serbian Village Studies (considered the father of Village Studies 
in Serbia), from the perspective of resettlement.31
The issue of land claims against Hungary was permanently taken off the agenda
during Tito’s last visit to Moscow on May 28th, 1946. During the talks, Tito urged
the Soviets to provide economic assistance and assured Stalin that “the Yugoslavian
government does not intend to allow capital from other powers into its economy”.
Finally, almost marginally, he informed Stalin about the Hungarian–Yugoslavian
relations. “Tito said that the Yugoslavian government had decided not to address
Yugoslavian land claims against Hungary (in regards to the Baja Triangle) in the
Council of Ministers”. To which Stalin approvingly remarked: “If Hungary wishes
to have peaceful relations with Yugoslavia, then Yugoslavia must support that endeavor”,
especially, he reminded Tito not without any insinuation, because “Yugoslavia 
is primarily having difficulties in their relations with Greece and Italy”.32
On August 26th, 1946 Edvard Kardelj, Minister of Foreign Affairs and leader of the
Yugoslavian peace delegation, made an unexpected offer of a “voluntary population
exchange of approximately 40 thousand people, within a modest framework”, 
to the leader of the Hungarian peace delegation, János Gyöngyösi, in Paris, as well
as to sign an agreement on the water supply under Baja. Kardelj first ensured Gyöngyösi
that Yugoslavia would make no land claims against Hungary but, as if compensating
for this, they should enter into a contract regarding the Baja water supply. Joîe Vilfan,
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secretary-general of the Yugoslavian peace delegation, let the Hungarians know
that if they accept the population exchange proposition, then Yugoslavia will not
submit its proposition for the amendment of the Hungarian peace agreement,
which would have provided special education and nationality rights to Yugoslavians
living in Hungary.
István Kertész, the secretary-general of the Hungarian peace delegation called
the offer “a surprising ultimatum”, which the Hungarian side should have accepted
within 48 hours. A hectic flutter began in Budapest because they did not want to lose
the Yugoslavians’ good will at the peace talks, which they were greatly in need of,
especially against Czechoslovakia. Ferenc Nagy, Smallholder Party Prime Minister,
called the Yugoslavian draft a “very mild and friendly” proposal compared to the
Czechoslovak–Hungarian population exchange agreement. He called attention to the
fact that they should not “arm the Slovakians” with a possible refusal. The Council
of Ministers essentially accepted the Yugoslavians’ population exchange draft without
modification.33 On September 12th, 1946 Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Kardelj and
Gyöngyösi agreed in principal to the population exchange, released a joint bulletin
about the agreement and the Yugoslavian delegation withdrew its above mentioned
proposal to amend the Hungarian peace agreement. The population exchange
agreement was concluded in a unique way, through correspondence, and was quite
highly publicized in both countries. The contract comprised 11 sections, which stated
that the resettlement was voluntary and pertained to 40 000 people. The contract
alludes to the fact that Yugoslavia will have the “right of recommendation” regarding
the resettlers. These proposals were determined to fall under the jurisdiction of a joint
commission. Resettlement propaganda could only be carried out by the Yugoslavian
side on Hungarian territory. The Hungarian side, in Yugoslavia, did not have this
same right. Resettlers were only allowed to take their movable assets with them,
real estate assets left behind would have been mutually credited. The Hungarian
Ministry of Foreign Affairs sought to assess resettlement intentions among Yugoslavians
living in Hungary. They were surprised to find that there were barely any applicants.
The Hungarians of the Vajdaság, however, were “preparing to leave in droves”. 34
According to Hungarian archival sources, the population exchange was never
carried out.35
If we want to answer the legitimate but complicated question of why, out of all
its neighbors, did Hungary, despite the afore mentioned problems, form the best
relationship with Yugoslavia after the war, furthermore, why Yugoslavia initiated
the rapprochement, we must take into consideration the following factors: firstly,
among the Hungarian coalition parties, it was primarily the communists who
considered it important to build closer ties with Yugoslavia, since they saw in this
the outside support of the reinforcement of internal political positions. They considered
Yugoslavia’s internal system an example to be followed, going so far as having the
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Ministry of Defense’s state secretary, in the Spring of 1946, ask the ACC’s Yugoslavian
delegation to send them the Yugoslavian army’s military regulations because “it would
serve as the basis for the Hungarian army’s regulations”. 36 Between October 10th
and 15th, 1947 a police committee led by Police Lieutenant-General Gábor Péter,
who was rising to infamy at the helm of the State Security Agency (ÁVH), and Endre
Szebenyi, visited Yugoslavia in order to study the local state security institutions.37
These internal military relationships would also be worth exploring in detail.
During the period of the armistice, because it was a country with limited sovereignty,
Hungary could not officially initiate diplomatic relations with any country. Other
countries did this in its stead, among them Yugoslavia. In the autumn of 1945,
the ACC’s Yugoslavian delegation had already made a promise to the Smallholder
Party Minister of Foreign Affairs, János Gyöngyösi, that if Hungary supports
Yugoslavia’s claims to Trieste, then the Yugoslavian government will support
Hungary not only at the peace talks but even at the peace preparations “in all
questions that do not oppose Yugoslavia’s interest”. 38 It seemed as though this was
not an empty promise on Yugoslavia’s part. In the summer of 1945, when Rákosi
and Rajk visited Belgrade, they agreed that the Yugoslavian government would
moderate Prague in regards to the harsh and inhumane persecution of Hungarians
living in Slovakia, which they indeed did in several cases. In 1947 Yugoslavia
supported Hungary’s admission into the UN.39 Even then, Belgrade was not
neutral on whether or not there is a sympathetic country beyond their northern
border, one which, in fact, shares the same social configuration, which in return
supports Yugoslavia’s supranationalist plans for the Balkans. 40 Yugoslavia’s main
foreign policy endeavor was to create an external situation that would help solidify
the new communist power.
In August of 1945, a few months after the liberation of Belgrade, the Yugoslav–
Hungarian Association, led by writer, Lajos Zilahy, who at the time was the leader
of the Hungarian–Soviet Friendship Society, commissioned by the Hungarian–
Yugoslavian Association’s preparation delegation, visited the Yugoslavian capital.
Their goal was multi-directional: they tried to establish contacts among the representatives
of the arts and cultural world, they wanted to ascertain the attitude toward the
Hungarian–Yugoslavian Association in official circles, and to view the building
of the former Hungarian consulate on behalf of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
The report from their travel reads: “The building of the Hungarian consulate (in Krunska
ulica) is, unfortunately, in an unusable condition. The top floor has burned down,
in the right wing of the ground floor there are 3, on the left there are 4 rooms in »usable«
condition. So, there is severe fire damage in these as well, the roof in the hall has caved
in with fallen beams and rubble. At the moment some kind of Fire Guard headquarters
occupies three rooms. Renovating the building, if at all possible, would cost millions,
but due to today’s lack of material, this is almost impossible.” 41
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The issue of establishing diplomatic relationships was already addressed in autumn
of 1945, the deterrence of which was explained by the purposely dark portrayal 
of the Yugoslavian minorities’ educational and cultural situation in Hungary, 
as well as the “very bureaucratic” Hungarian stance regarding the extradition of war
criminals.42 In Paris, on September 25th, 1946, Stanoje Simiæ, Yugoslavian Minister
of Foreign Affairs, during the peace talks, addressed the Hungarian government
in a memorandum, in which he communicated that due to the agreement in principal
regarding the water supply and the population exchange they are “willing to establish
diplomatic relations with Hungary”. The Hungarian government turned to the ACC
immediately in order to obtain the consent necessary for establishing these contacts.
On October 4th, Ivan Ivanovich Levushkin, ACC chief of staff, who held the rank
of major, informed the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that the ACC “had no objection”
to the restoration of diplomatic relations between the two countries.43 In the middle
of October 1946, so before the Hungarian peace agreement was signed, technical
and political preparations began around the implementation of the Hungarian
consulate in Belgrade.
Chosen to be the first post war ambassador, returning from emigration in Moscow,
was Zoltán Szántó44, a communist belonging to Rákosi’s inner circle who was thus
a welcomed guest in Belgrade.
The ambassador and his colleagues began their work in Belgrade under very
difficult circumstances. The building of the former Hungarian consulate, as mentioned
before, suffered a severe bomb strike during the war.
Because of this, at first, they had to reside in hotel rooms that “cost a fortune”
but had been deteriorated by the war. Not having any automobiles, the ambassador
and his colleagues had to travel on foot. It was obvious that Szántó did not handle
easily these quite uncomfortable circumstances. In his reports to Budapest, he often
raised complaints and requested that their circumstances be improved. As he wrote
in one of his reports in April of 1947, “I had to conduct a series of introductory
visits while traveling on foot in the sopping wet streets of Belgrade. I often felt ashamed
to arrive in the study of an ambassador or minister with muddy shoes. Sometimes
they took pity on me and sent me home by car. It has also happened that, due to bad
weather, I had to cancel appointments at the last minute only to have them send 
a car for me.” He then added emphatically, “It is not a good thing if an ambassador’s
work circumstances incite pity from his colleagues. No less embarrassing is receiving
visitors in my cramped, dirty hotel room, where the slush seeps through the cracks
in the roof making fantastic frescoes. (...) This afternoon there will be a reception
in Avala but first, I have to make phone calls to find out which ambassador will 
be kind enough to give me a ride.” 45 On other occasions he used even harsher words.
“I find it very awkward to always be dealing with such financial matters. It is possible
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that our government cannot provide the funds necessary for the consulate’s maintenance.
If this is truly the case, then we must reorganize our diplomatic representation 
in Belgrade, the ambassador must be called back, and the most necessary tasks should
be carried out by a caretaker and one or two subordinates.”,46 he writes. At this time
Szántó obviously had no idea yet that he would soon be called back but not because
of the consulate building’s truly desolate state but due to the severe 1948 political crisis
around Yugoslavia and the dramatic escalation of Hungarian–Yugoslavian relations.47
On February 4th, 1947, a few days before the signing of the Paris Peace Treaties,
Ambassador Zoltán Szántó handed over his letter of credence to Ivan Ribar, President
of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.48 Translating Hungarian foreign
policy’s most important message to Belgrade, he structured his speech around the
dichotomy of victorious superiority and guilt. He spoke of Yugoslavia’s “rebirth
under the heroic liberating war lead by Marshal Tito” and clearly dissociated from
“the guilty politics of a system foreign to the Hungarian people”. He emphasized,
“the rebirth of Hungary and the fight against the fascist reaction” made possible a new
basis of the relationship between the two countries.
In 1947, the relations between the two countries became more cordial than ever
before, crowned by Josip Broz Tito’s visit to Hungary, amid shining formalities,
in December 1947. Tito’s visit was preceded by Lajos Dinnyés’ trip to Belgrade 
in October 1947, which was not only noteworthy because of the secured cultural
agreement, but because this was the first time a Hungarian Prime Minister set
foot in Belgrade.
Tito’s visit unequivocally signified that this was not a meeting between the
leaders of two equal countries at Keleti Railway Station. Prime Minister Dinnyés
was basically apologizing to Yugoslavia for the past when in his welcome speech
he said: Hungary “is guilty of a series of serious crimes against the freedom-loving
peoples of Yugoslavia”. On the one hand, because “Hungary kept minorities under
relentless oppression”; on the other, because in World War I they attacked the
Yugoslavians; and finally, because they were responsible for the ensuing “bloodbath”
in the Vajdaság after Horthy treasonously attacked Yugoslavia. After this, the Prime
Minister expressed gratitude “for the full range of human and civil rights Marshal
Tito provides the Hungarians of the Vajdaság. The Yugoslavian government’s wise
Leninist–Stalinist national policy results in completely equal rights for our brothers
in the Vajdaság.” 49
Tito, when signing a mutual agreement of friendship and assistance on December
8th in the parliament, answered, reflecting on this that: “Everyone who professes
the principles of a true people’s democracy, who holds the position that ethnic
issues must be solved in the correct, Stalinist way, is our friend, be they Hungarian,
Czech, Polish or anyone else, it does not matter”.50
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József Rex, secretary of the Hungarian consulate in Belgrade, who accompanied
the Marshal’s train all the way from Belgrade, wrote a rather unflattering episode
regarding Tito’s trip to Budapest in his memoir: “Ambassador Szántó and myself
were on Tito’s private train. It does not give me pleasure to spoil anything but Tito
fed ham to his German shepherd, Tiger, with a gold knife and fork from a Rosenthal
plate. Barely a week before, I was at the construction site of the Youth Railway in the
Bosnian mountains, where the enthusiastic young people were made to work in snow
and ice receiving only half a kilo of cornbread and two bowls of soup to eat per day.” 51
The treaty of friendship, cooperation and mutual assistance was signed in the
parliament on December 8th, in the Council of Ministers’ hall by Prime Ministers
Lajos Dinnyés and Josip Broz Tito. The treaty was to be valid for 20 years starting
January 20th, 1948.52 Unlike the Yugoslavian–Albanian and the Yugoslavian–Bulgarian
friendship agreements, the contract did not specify any closer economic, financial
or military integration but did not exclude these possibilities. As it says in the
agreement in regards to this: “The Contracting Parties agree that with the aim 
of solidifying close cooperation between the two countries, they will join forces in the
interest of their countries and people in the name of a tried and long-term friendship”.
It is no coincidence that the Hungarian Communist Party’s newspaper, Szabad Nép
(Free People) hailed the Yugoslavian delegation as the New Great Power. The article
welcomed the integration of the region’s seven “democracies” (Yugoslavia, Hungary,
Czechoslovakia, Poland, Bulgaria, Romania and Albania) as the establishment 
of a “unified front”.53 So, the 1947 Treaty of Friendship still envisioned a regional
integration, which though counted on support from the Soviet Union, did not
wish for it to assume an exclusive role as leader. However, a few months later, 
at the time of the Yugoslavian and Bulgarian delegations’ visit to Moscow, Stalin
made it clear that he laid claim to the direct leadership of the region and did not
wish to share it with anyone, not even the Yugoslavs.
One of the most important events in the history of Hungarian–Yugoslavian
relations after 1945 is the reparation agreement between the two countries, which
was signed on May 11th, 1946.54 I only wish to reference Hungary’s obligation to pay
Yugoslavia reparation (7 million dollars) to say that the payments began in order.
Following Yugoslavia’s, the Soviet Union’s and Czechoslovakia’s gesture, the original
6 years allotted for delivering the reparation was prolonged to 8 years at Budapest’s
request on August 8th, 1946. Later, also citing Moscow’s example, the Hungarian
government requested the remainder of the reparation to be decreased by 50%.
This request was, however, denied by the Yugoslavians based on the Information
Office’s June 27th, 1948 decision and due to the deterioration of the relationship
between the two countries.55 All Hungarian assets in Yugoslavia were nationalized,
or more accurately, the previous nationalization of the assets of Hungarian citizens
116
Academic Announcements
Délvidéki Szemle Vol III. No 2. 2016.
and legal persons in Yugoslavia was completed. According to a statement by the
Hungarian Ministry of Finances, apart from the 5% interest due for late payment
specified in the reparation agreement, Hungary had payed 29.8% of the entire
reparation sum by August 25th of 1948, when it was discontinued, so Hungary remained
49.2 million dollars in debt to Yugoslavia.
By 1947 economic relations were regulated by a two-sided trade agreement 
of 2 million dollars for both countries in that year. Yugoslavia primarily transported
raw material (iron ore, copper, lead, zinc, mercury, acetic acid, etc.) and Hungary
payed in machinery, locomotives, medicine, etc. On May 11th, 1947 a 15 year, 32 million
dollar aluminum agreement was signed, which was followed on June 24th by a 5 year,
120 million dollar mutual trade agreement.56
Following the international “show trial” against Yugoslavia, that is, due to the
Soviet–Yugoslav conflict, Hungary went from good neighbor to adversary again.57
The Rajk Trial saw the Hungarian–Yugoslavian Treaty of Friendship seated at the
defendant’s chair, because, according to the prosecution, the treason occurred
while Tito was going home to Belgrade. On September 30th, 1949 the Hungarian
government terminated the contract. They justified the termination of the contract
saying that “Yugoslavia had already started planning to overthrow the Hungarian
People’s Republic during the time the friendship and mutual assistance agreements
were signed, and to this end, members of the Yugoslavian government were holding
secret discussions with police-spy, provocateur and imperialist agent, László Rajk.
(...) The Yugoslavian government has behaved in a hostile manner toward Hungary
for years, instead of friendship and alliance they did everything in their power 
to overthrow the People’s Republic, aided Hungary’s internal and external enemies
and dragged the Hungarian–Yugoslavian treaty of friendship, cooperation and mutual
assistance agreement through the mud. Hence, from this day forth, the government
of the Hungarian People’s Republic feels exempt from any obligations named in said
contract.” 58 On October 7th, 1949 Yugoslavia acknowledged in a memorandum that
the responsibility for this rests “solely” on the Hungarian government.59 Although
they did not follow through with complete termination of diplomatic relations,
Hungary, which was now unequivocally under Soviet protectorate, also terminated
its economic agreements one by one. The aluminum industry agreement of May 11th,
1947, for example, was done away with on June 15th, 1949, the five year economic
treaty of July 24th, 1947 aborted three days later, but practically all economic agreements
suffered the same fate. The cultural and other restitutional issues determined 
in the peace treaty also came to a standstill.60 On August 25th, 1948 Hungary discontinued
its reparation payments to Yugoslavia, which had been secured by international
agreements. From 1949 only 15 technical agreements remained in place between
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the two countries. Such contracts as the 1926 agreement regarding the maintenance
of ironwork bridges connecting the two states’ railway lines, the 1928 agreement
regulating guardianship, but we can also mention the 1947 air traffic agreement
and the 1948 water-agreement. From 1949 the Rajk Trial, the severe, armed border
conflicts, the fierce propaganda war, the relocation of the Yugoslav population
along the border and other issues veritably criminalized the relationship between
the two countries. 
This was the low point from which Hungarian–Yugoslavian relations had 
to be rebuilt following the death of Stalin.
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